Economics Seminar（2015-20）

Topic:On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders

Speaker:Peter Norman

Affiliation:University of North Carolina

Time:Tuesday, Nov. 17 from 2:00-3:30pm

Location:Room 217, Guanghua Building 2

Abstract:

We consider a class of multi-sender persuasion games that accommodate both sequential and simultaneous moves. If information can be arbitrarily correlated and new senders are added at the beginning of the game, then information cannot be lost. In contrast, we provide examples where the addition of a sender results in a loss of information when (i) senders move sequentially and a new sender is added after the pre-existing players; (ii) senders move simultaneously, and signals are not arbitrarily correlated; (iii) senders move simultaneously and mixed strategies are allowed. We also reinterpret the model with coordinated signals as one where senders moves sequentially and observe the history of experimental designs as well as the outcomes.

CV

Your participation is warmly welcomed!